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Comments
The Old Bailment Doctrine: The
Answer to Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence in the Digital Age
Shane Gallant*
INTRODUCTION

In today’s digital world, private citizens are finding a certain
level of satisfaction and reliability in all aspects of life. From selfdriving automobiles to the newly integrated smart homes and
cities—life could not be easier. For example, Tara is a business
executive who is always on the go. To save time, she has outfitted
her home with today’s most innovative technology. She purchased
an Amazon Echo that is powered by Amazon’s voice-activated
assistant, Alexa.1 Tara uses this device to make purchases, place
phone calls, send text messages, maintain her calendar, play music,
and control the lights and home security system. 2 However, Tara

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2020. A special thank you to Professor Emily Sack for her guidance throughout
the writing process. To my wife, Tara, thank you so much for supporting me
throughout my law school career.
1. Ry Crist & Andrew Gebhart, Everything You Need to Know About the
Amazon Echo, CNET (Sept. 21, 2018, 10:49 AM), https://www.cnet.com/howto/amazon-echo-alexa-everything-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/4R7VECJC].
2. Id. In the United States, the Amazon Echo now features over 30,000
skills that help make everyday life easier. Bret Kinsella, Amazon Alexa Skill
Count Surpasses 30,000 in the U.S., VOICEBOT (Mar. 22, 2018, 4:57 PM),
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likely does not know that each call, text, purchase, and request is
stored and timestamped on Amazon’s cloud. 3
Today, lives are run through devices like cell phones, products
such as the Amazon Echo, and social media platforms.
Technological globalization has generated many legal questions,
the most important of which deal with personal privacy. Assume,
for example, the government suspects Tara of a crime. Through
some quick investigating, the government determines that much of
her personal information is stored on Amazon’s cloud because many
of Tara’s electronic devices are connected to her Amazon Echo. The
issue is that many people do not understand the extent to which the
government can obtain data stored on a company’s cloud service.
The hard truth is that the government seldom needs a warrant to
access one’s sensitive information stored with a third party, 4 and
those third parties will not always provide notice when the
government is requesting said information.5
Like most people, Tara does not think of the privacy
implications of the digital age; she is just happy to live in an
advanced society, especially after her father’s recent heart attack.
Given advancements in medical technology, Tara’s father, Bill, is
comfortable knowing that he has a new pacemaker that allows for
real-time wireless monitoring, an implantable cardioverter
defibrillator, and long-lasting battery life that automatically
transmits its data straight to his physician. 6 Bill’s physicians have
https://voicebot.ai/2018/03/22/amazon-alexa-skill-count-surpasses-30000-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/9EEW-LHUE].
3. See Russel Brandom, How Much Can Police Find Out from a
Murderer’s
Echo?,
THE
VERGE
(Jan.
26,
2017,
9:05
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/6/14189384/amazon-echo-murder-evidencesurveillance-data [https://perma.cc/S9HZ-9JCB]. According to Amazon,
“[C]loud storage is a cloud computing model that stores data on the Internet
through a cloud computing provider who manages and operates data storage
as a service.” See Cloud Storage, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/what-iscloud-storage/ [https://perma.cc/X9PV-4QZZ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
4. See Anne Pfeifle, Comment, Alexa, What Should We Do About Privacy?
Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 421,
430-31 (2018); see also infra Part IV.
5. See Pfeifle, supra note 4, at 431–32 (“Microsoft alleged that in a
twenty-month period, federal courts issued 3,250 secrecy orders to Microsoft
alone to prevent it from communicating with customers about requests for
data, and of those about two-thirds had no end date.”).
6. Dave Fornell, New Pacemaker Technologies, DAIC (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.dicardiology.com/article/new-pacemaker-technologies
[https://
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all the recorded data at their disposal to make adjustments to his
treatment as needed, which Bill loves since he no longer needs to
make multiple trips to his doctor for testing. But, should Bill feel
so comfortable? Could the government simply subpoena or obtain
a court order for Bill’s pacemaker information if they believed that
he was connected to a crime? Sadly, for Tara and Bill, the
government can obtain Tara’s records from Amazon’s cloud service
as well as the pacemaker records from Bill’s doctor through a court
order or subpoena. 7 As society advances into a new technological
era, current laws will continue to lose their effect in protecting a
citizen’s privacy rights.
Society is quickly shifting from technology known as the
Internet to the broader Internet of Things (IoT).8 “[T]he [IoT] is a
concept of connecting any device (so long as it has an on/off switch)
to the Internet and to other connected devices.” 9 The IoT
“connect[s] things and people—all of which collect and share data
about the way they are used and about the environment around
them.” 10 This new shift in technology is a major cause of concern
for private citizens because current privacy laws cannot keep pace
with this ever-changing digital landscape—a landscape where it is
conceivable that all of one’s information will pass through the IoT,
and that information will not be protected under the Fourth
Amendment.
Although the legal system is trying to keep pace with the
digital world, the system is reactionary and will always be behind
the curve of technology. Currently, the government is taking
advantage of the privacy laws to the detriment of peoples’ privacy
rights through its use of the third-party doctrine. That is, when an
individual willingly discloses information to a third-party, such as
one providing banking information to his or her financial
perma.cc/GVN6-WFR5] (explaining new advancements in pacemaker
technology).
7. See infra Section I.B., which provides the cases that formed the basis
for this Comment’s introductory hypothetical.
8. Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., The Internet of Things: Abandoning the
Third-Party Doctrine and Protecting Data Encryption, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 89, 90
(2017).
9. Jen Clark, What Is the Internet of Things, IBM: INTERNET OF THINGS
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/what-isthe-iot/ [https://perma.cc/S3RQ-CZZB].
10. Id.
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institution, that individual loses his or her reasonable expectation
of privacy in the material disclosed.11 Thus, courts will not provide
Fourth Amendment protections if the government obtains
information that is in the custody of a third party. 12 To date, it is
widely accepted that the third-party doctrine allows the
government to access an individual’s personal information stored
by digital data providers because that information is considered
voluntarily provided. 13 Accordingly, if current constitutional
doctrines are not amended to protect citizens in the digital age, then
it is conceivable that government officials will have unregulated
access to an individual’s personal information that is stored,
monitored, and analyzed by various companies, creating an allinclusive picture of any IoT user.
This Comment will focus on providing a solution to protect
citizens’ privacy in the digital age against unreasonable searches,
while balancing the government’s interest in obtaining evidence for
criminal and civil litigation. Specifically, Part I will provide a
background into the IoT and its future development in our society.
Part II will discuss traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
explaining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, and thus,
what is protected by the Constitution. Part III will discuss the
history of the third-party doctrine and how its current
interpretation is ill-suited for a technological society. Part IV will
provide an analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the
digital age, discussing two key Supreme Court decisions that
highlight the dangers of the third-party doctrine and current
privacy law as it relates to technology. Part V will provide a
description of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) given that the
government is using this statute as a way of circumventing a
citizen’s Fourth Amendment protections. Part VI will discuss the
Supreme Court’s attempt to limit the third-party doctrine as it
pertains to historical cell-site location information (CSLI) in
Carpenter v. United States. 14 Lastly, Part VII draws from Justice
Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Carpenter 15 and proposes the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Posadas, supra note 8, at 102.
See id.
See id.
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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creation of the “adhesion bailment” doctrine as a solution for saving
the Fourth Amendment from the third-party doctrine in the digital
age.
I.

THE INTERNET OF THINGS

The IoT can be defined as a global platform that connects
sensors to objects, providing those objects with the ability to
communicate with one another via the internet. 16 For example, in
Philadelphia, self-reporting trash compactors feature sensors that
alert the compactor to compact the trash as it reaches a certain
level, and connects to the Philadelphia Streets Department
providing data on how full its compactors are, whether they need to
be emptied, and whether maintenance or repair is required.17 IoT
technology provides data processing, storage, and analysis all in
real-time applications.18 Two of the largest implementations of IoT
technology are found in the creation of the smart home and the
smart city.
A. The Integration of the Smart Home and City
The smart home is not the wave of the future. It is already
here, given that just about all of the technology found in one’s living
space has a smart home alternative. 19 A smart home is a residence
that uses internet-connected devices to manage and monitor
everyday living and use of one’s home. 20 Devices like thermostats,
televisions, locks, garage door openers, and security systems are
just a few of the devices that can interconnect with a home’s

16. See Clark, supra note 9.
17. Stéphane Bourgeois, The Internet of Things in Real Life: 6 IoT
Examples, BELDEN: EMERGING TECH. & APPLICATIONS BLOG (June 9, 2017)
https://www.belden.com/blog/smart-building/the-internet-of-things-in-reallife-6-iot-examples [https://perma.cc/9VCR-FQPM].
18. Posadas, supra note 8, at 93 (citing Leon Hounshell, Forecasting
Profitable Models for the Internet of Things, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/03/23/forecastingprofitable-models-for-the-internet-of-things/#71b98c583e94) [https://perma.cc/
X5VK-PJMD].
19. Margaret Rouse, Cutting Edge: IT’s Guide to Edge Data Centers, IOT
AGENDA, https://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/smart-home
-or-building [https://perma.cc/RZ8W-KSXC] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
20. Id.
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wireless network making life more efficient. 21 Although these
devices make life easier, they also store, compile, and analyze each
and every moment of one’s day.22
Just as technology companies are streamlining the home with
digital technology, local governments have also begun
implementing IoT technology into its cities. 23 For example, in 2018,
Columbus, Ohio, implemented a connected vehicle system that
alerts drivers about related driving behavior patterns in their
respective driving areas, and alerts drivers to all objects
surrounding the vehicle. 24 This system will eventually provide
drivers, specifically first responders, with enhanced accident
reports and real-time data regarding high-traffic areas—all geared
toward improving citizen safety. 25
The technological advances of society are creating a vast world
that makes life easier, more manageable, and safer. However, as
the IoT continues to develop, the risk of losing Fourth Amendment
protections will continue to increase. For instance, the
hypotheticals in this Comment’s Introduction were not provided to
illustrate what will eventually happen—they are situations that
have already taken place, as demonstrated in the two cases below.
21. See id. For an illustration of how smart home technology provides for
a more efficient life, consider the following example:
Imagine you wake up at 7am every day to go to work. Your alarm
clock does the job of waking you just fine. That is, until something
goes wrong. Your train’s cancelled and you have to drive to work
instead. The only problem is that it takes longer to drive, and you
would have needed to get up at 6:45am to avoid being late. Oh, and
it’s pouring with rain, so you’ll need to drive slower than usual. A
connected or IoT-enabled alarm clock would reset itself based on all
these factors, to ensure you got to work on time. It could recognize
that your usual train is cancelled, calculate the driving distance and
travel time for your alternative route to work, check the weather and
factor in slower travelling speed because of heavy rain, and calculate
when it needs to wake you up so you’re not late. If it’s super-smart,
[it] might even sync with your IoT-enabled coffee maker, to ensure
your morning caffeine’s ready to go when you get up.
Clark, supra note 9.
22. Posadas, supra note 8, at 97–98.
23. See id. at 97.
24. See Nicole George, The Top Smart Cities, ALLCONNECT (June 28, 2018)
https://www.allconnect.com/blog/top-us-smart-cities-to-watch/ [https://perma.
cc/BPN4-6L2T].
25. Id.
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B. Cases Illustrating a Decreased Expectation of Privacy in the
Digital Age
In 2017, Timothy Verrill was charged with murdering
Christine Sullivan and Jenna Pellegrini in Ms. Sullivan’s New
Hampshire home. 26 New Hampshire prosecutors believed that an
Amazon Echo which belonged to the victim contained evidence of
the murders.27 The judge overseeing Verrill’s trial issued a court
order directing Amazon to produce records created between
January 27 and January 29, 2017, under a theory that the Amazon
Echo may have activated and thus recorded the victims’ final
moments. 28
In 2016, Ross Compton was suspected and later indicted on
felony charges of aggravated arson and insurance fraud for
allegedly starting a fire in his Middletown, Ohio home, based in
part on evidence found on his pacemaker.29 The government used
the data found on Compton’s pacemaker to prove that he was not
physically capable of performing the tasks he claimed to have
accomplished during the night of the fire. 30 Police obtained a
search warrant for data recorded on the pacemaker and, after
medical technicians downloaded the data revealing heart rate and
cardiac rhythms before, during, and after the fire, the police
subpoenaed and ultimately obtained the data. 31

26. Kimberly Haas, Murder Victims’ Families Upset They Weren’t Warned
About
Recordings,
N.H.
UNION
LEADER
(Nov.
14,
2018)
https://www.unionleader.com/news/courts/murder-victims-families-upset-they
-weren-t-warned-about-recordings/article_c75ceeec-69a2-54d8-b20f-2ad5f6fec
f9c.html [https://perma.cc/HBJ6-RMG2].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lauren Pack, Arson Suspect in Unique Case Featuring Pacemaker
Data is Back in Custody, JOURNAL-NEWS (July 24, 2018) https://www.journalnews.com/news/arson-suspect-unique-case-featuring-pacemaker-data-backcustody/dn6JyzsOemZovpayJMZLNJ/ [https://perma.cc/DRK5-SAGG].
30. See id. Mr. Compton claimed that when he awoke from the fire, he
packed his belongings in multiple bags, grabbed his computer and medical
device charger, broke a window with his cane, and threw his luggage out of it
before abandoning his home. Deanna Paul, Your Own Pacemaker Can Now
Testify Against You in Court, WIRED (July 29, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/your-own-pacemaker-can-now-testify-againstyou-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/TP7R-JG8Q].
31. Paul, supra note 30.
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The cases presented above illustrate how stored data that is
transmitted through digitally connected devices provide the
government a way of accessing personal information without the
need for a warrant. The government is simply obtaining a subpoena
or court order for the data that was transmitted and now stored
with a third-party. The development of stronger connectivity,
intelligence, and convenience functions on digital devices creates a
greater risk of private data being exposed to the outside world.32
Stephanie Lacambra, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s criminal
defense attorney, sums up Compton’s case, and the disturbing truth
of the digital world:
The reality is that we are no longer the sole proprietors or
controllers of our personal information . . . . For people
worried about being monitored in that way, this ruling is
chilling. If Compton didn’t want doctors and law
enforcement to have access to his heartbeat, what
alternative did he have—decide against getting a
pacemaker? 33
Using the newest innovative technological gadgets leaves
citizens and their property vulnerable to third-party technology
providers. With the implementation of smart homes and cities,
citizens will have no choice but to share their information with third
parties, forcing private citizens to integrate into the IoT.
Accordingly, the duty to protect an individual’s privacy is
incumbent upon citizens, legislators, and the courts to ensure that
the Fourth Amendment remains intact and continues to protect the
nation’s citizens from unlawful searches. To accomplish this goal,
legislatures must modify current laws so the government cannot
compel technology companies to provide access to stored data,34 and
courts should reevaluate the third-party doctrine in the digital
One must first understand the history of Fourth
age. 35
Amendment jurisprudence, as described in the next section, in
order to see the extent of the concerns raised by the IoT and the

32.
33.
34.
35.

See id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See infra Part V.
See infra Part III.
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third-party doctrine and appreciate the need for enhanced privacy
rights in a technological society.
II. TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 36 As illustrated in United
States v. Jones, there are currently two approaches courts use to
analyze whether the government conducted a Fourth Amendment
search. 37 The first approach, developed in Olmstead v. United
States, is known as the physical trespass test. 38 If the government
physically trespasses on an individual’s constitutionally protected
property for the purpose of obtaining information, courts will
generally conclude that a Fourth Amendment search occurred. 39
Under the second approach, outlined in Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Katz v. United States, courts will likely conclude that
a Fourth Amendment search took place if the government violates
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 40 The Katz test
has two requirements: first, the individual must display a
subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that expectation must
be one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 41
Originally, the Court in Katz appeared to replace the physical
trespass test created in Olmstead v. United States. 42 The Jones
Court made it clear, however, that Justice Harlan’s reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis in Katz did not extinguish the
“physical trespass” rule: “The Katz reasonable-expectations test
‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional propertybased understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” 43 Although
courts still utilize the physical trespass test, Fourth Amendment
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012).
38. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66 (1928).
39. See id. (holding that wiretapping did not amount to search within
meaning of Fourth Amendment because there was no actual physical invasion
of defendant’s house or curtilage for purpose of making seizure).
40. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
43. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (1928)).
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search analysis is generally conducted using the far murkier
reasonable expectation of privacy test created in Katz. 44
Accordingly, an individual may be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection of “what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public.” 45 Therefore, Fourth
Amendment protection does not necessarily depend on the material
sought, but rather on the relationship the individual creates with
the information and his surroundings that give rise to an
expectation of privacy.46 This premise was first illustrated in Katz:
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth
from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed
partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it
as he would have been if he had remained outside. But
what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was
not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not
shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls
from a place where he might be seen. 47
Thus, the question that must be answered is: How can the
judiciary continue to provide privacy protection to citizens in the
digital age? Interestingly enough, the Jones Court’s analysis
suggests that the presence of technological devices may diminish
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of
defining a Fourth Amendment search. 48 In its analysis, the Court
reintroduced the old physical trespass test under the Fourth
Amendment to ensure strong protections for individual privacy. 49
Before discussing the Court’s blended analysis under Jones, this
44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (likening
electronic intrusion to physical intrusion).
45. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion).
46. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 822
(2004) (“The ‘critical’ fact was the relationship that Katz had established when
he occupied the phone booth, shut the door behind him, and ‘pa[id] the toll that
permit[ted] him to place a call.’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring))).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
48. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (holding government installation of GPS
device and subsequent analysis of data constitutes Fourth Amendment search
because government physically occupied private property to obtain
information).
49. See discussion of Jones, infra Section IV.B.
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Comment will first provide a background of the third-party doctrine
and highlight the dangers of losing all Fourth Amendment
protection if the third-party doctrine is not interpreted in a way
that suits the digital age.
III. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

An individual generally does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy when he or she voluntarily discloses information to a
third party. 50 As it stands, the current interpretation of the thirdparty doctrine took shape after the Court’s rulings in two cases,
United States v. Miller 51 and Smith v. Maryland.52 In Miller, the
government subpoenaed two banks where the defendant had
accounts.53 The subpoenas required the banks to produce all of the
defendant’s accounts, which the Court described as “negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”54 The
defendant sought to suppress the bank records, arguing that the
government conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.55 The Court disagreed with the defendant’s
argument and found that:
The [bank] depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed. 56
Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed
whether the government’s use of a pen register violated the
50. Posadas, supra note 8, at 102; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751, 753 (1971) (holding government’s use of agents who themselves may
reveal contents of conversations with an accused does not violate Fourth
Amendment).
51. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
52. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
53. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.
54. Id. at 437–38, 442.
55. See id. at 438, 442.
56. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
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defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 57 “A pen register is a
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone
by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and
does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.” 58 The
Court found, as it did in Miller, that the defendant voluntarily
conveyed the subject information (the numbers he dialed) to a third
party (the telephone company) when he placed his calls through an
operator.59 The Court recognized that the phone company recorded
the numerical information at issue “for a variety of legitimate
business purposes.” 60 Thus, when the defendant used his phone,
“he assumed the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to
police the numbers he dialed.” 61
In today’s technological world, scholars question whether the
current interpretation of the third-party doctrine should be strictly
applied. 62 The doctrine creates a diminished expectation of privacy
in information that one voluntarily shares.63 However, as the IoT
continues to advance, the expectation of privacy established under
the third-party doctrine constantly diminishes as a result of
individuals losing the choice of whether to share information
because their lives are constantly streaming through the IoT for
commercial purposes. Moreover, the way the government is using
the third-party doctrine bypasses the physical trespass form of a
search, given that no agent or officer has to physically intrude on
an individual’s property; the government can simply obtain a court
order or subpoena and compel the company to release the stored
information the government seeks, 64 essentially robbing
individuals of their privacy rights.

57. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.
58. Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161
n.1 (1977)).
59. Id. at 743–44.
60. Id. at 743.
61. Id. at 744.
62. Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 987–988 (2016).
63. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Pfeifle, supra note 4 at 431
(“[I]nformation obtained from storage receives a more relaxed standard than
information obtained in transit.”).
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Thus, in light of technological globalization, one now assumes
the risk that when he or she uses devices that transmit data to
third-party companies, the information is automatically disentitled
to Fourth Amendment protection. Because technology is rapidly
advancing, more guidance is needed to determine when the Fourth
Amendment should apply. Further, the third-party doctrine needs
to be clearly defined to provide citizens with an understanding of
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in data shared
and stored on the IoT. Hence, Part IV will discuss the Supreme
Court’s attempt to provide some level of defense against losing
Fourth Amendment protection in the digital age, and Part V will
discuss statutory protection and illustrate how some forwardthinking States are implementing law that will not allow the
government to continue to rely on Smith, Miller, and the thirdparty doctrine in the technological era.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

As technology has evolved, so has the Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, albeit slowly. The two cases discussed
below not only highlight the Court’s analysis of the Fourth
Amendment and how it interacts with technology, but also provide
a warning that privacy laws must be amended to suit the digital
age. 65 The Court must acclimatize its understanding and modify
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to suit the evolution of
technology, because as it currently stands, most citizens do not feel
they have any expectation of privacy in the digital age. 66
A. Thermal Imaging – Kyllo v. United States
In Kyllo, government agents used a thermal imaging device to
inspect the interior of the defendant’s home from a public street to
gather evidence on the possibility that the defendant was growing
marijuana. 67 The thermal imaging device used by the government
“detect[s] infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but
65. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
66. See Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy is a Losing Game
Today—And How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018)
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-gametoday-and-how-to-change-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/ZN3A-THSB].
67. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30.
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which is not visible by the naked eye . . . [and] converts [that]
radiation into images based on relative warmth . . . operat[ing]
somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.” 68 The scan
revealed that some portions of Kyllo’s home were warmer than
others, and significantly warmer than his neighbors’ homes.69 The
Court held that when the government, even from a public
viewpoint, “obtain[s] by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise be obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area’ . . . a search [has occurred]—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public
use.” 70
The aspect of Kyllo most relevant to this discussion is that the
Court found that technology has decreased the level of protection
the Fourth Amendment provides.71 However, the Court concluded
by clearly stating that there is a high level of protection when
dealing with searches of a person’s home: “We have said that the
Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house,’
[and] [t]hat line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—
which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance
that require a warrant.”72 Hence, the government’s activity being
deemed a Fourth Amendment search was not contingent on the
level of intimacy of the information actually collected through
sense-enhancing technology, but rather that all details of the home
are considered intimate for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 73 The Court undoubtedly provides a high level of
protection to all activities that take place in the home.
68. Id. at 30–31.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id. at 34 (citations omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
71. See id. at 33–34.
72. Id. at 40 (citation omitted) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980)).
73. See id. at 37–38. The government argued that the Court could develop
a rule that would limit the prohibition of thermal imaging to “intimate details”;
however, the Court found that argument not only wrong in principle but
impractical. Id. at 38. The use of thermal vision would allow the government
to see not only any illegal activity but all activities; for example, the Court
noted that the use of thermal imaging could detect when the “lady of the house”
takes a bath—a detail that many would consider intimate. Id.
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However, even though Kyllo clearly provides a high level of
Fourth Amendment protection in the home, the Court has not
provided a solution for citizens to continue enjoying the same level
of privacy in the wake of the digital age. Kyllo’s holding leaves open
the possibility that one’s privacy rights will shrink as technology
advances given that a substantial amount of what the government
utilizes to gather information is available to the general public. For
example, thermal imaging devices are now at the fingertips of most
citizens; the government can accordingly argue that they no longer
intrude on an individual’s constitutionally protected right because
of the public’s newfound access to thermal-imaging technology.74
Thus, in order to maintain Fourth Amendment protection in the
digital age, the Court must overturn in part Kyllo’s holding.
B. GPS Tracking Devices – United States v. Jones
In Jones, the government placed Antoine Jones, a nightclub
owner and operator, under investigation for the alleged trafficking
of narcotics. 75 Based on the government’s investigation, the FBI
applied for a warrant authorizing the placement of a Global
Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on Jones’s automobile. 76
Once obtained, the FBI placed the GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of Jones’s vehicle and monitored its movement
twenty-four hours a day for approximately twenty-eight days.77
During the period Jones’s vehicle was monitored, the FBI collected
more than 2,000 pages of data detailing the vehicle’s location. 78
However, the warrant as implemented was invalid, 79 so the
Court had to considered whether the government’s actions
amounted to a Fourth Amendment search and thus whether a
74. See FLIR ONE Gen 3, FLIR, https://www.flir.com/products/flir-onegen-3/?model=435-0005-02&pi_ad_id=%7Bcreative%7D&creative=11174160
4345&keyword=&matchtype=&network=g&device=c&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIu
embk8LS4AIVB4TICh1NpAGvEAQYASABEgIDDvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/
FS78-WUMF] (last visited on Oct. 25, 2019).
75. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 402–03.
78. Id. at 403.
79. See id. at 402–403. (“A warrant [was] issued, authorizing installation
of the [GPS] device in the District of Columbia . . . within 10 days. On the 11th
day, and not in the District of Columbia but in Maryland, agents installed a
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep . . . .”).
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warrant was even required. 80 The Court held that the attachment
of a GPS device to a vehicle, “and subsequent use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements,” constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 81 Interestingly, Justice Scalia focused his
analysis on the government’s physical trespass, rather than Jones’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.82 The majority did not disturb
the reasonable expectation of privacy test defined in Katz. 83
Prior to Jones, Fourth Amendment analysis of the same issue
would have focused solely on whether the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, which could have led to a
different outcome. 84 Jones instead provided the courts with an
alternative means of establishing a Fourth Amendment search;
that is, by showing a governmental intrusion of a protected
property interest. 85 Given that the reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis relies in part on objective means—an expectation
of privacy that society is willing to accept as reasonable—it seems
that Justice Scalia recognized that the prevalence of technological
devices would in fact diminish objective expectations of privacy and
thus reintroduced the property-based approach to Fourth
Amendment search analysis.
The concurring Justices in Jones agreed that there was a
Fourth Amendment search, but on different grounds. 86 Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence is particularly notable because she
explicitly stated that the time has come to revisit and alter the
third-party doctrine as it applies in the digital age:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
80. See id. at 404–05.
81. Id. at 402.
82. See id. at 411.
83. Id.
84. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.”).
85. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07.
86. Id. at 413, 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (accepting the majority’s
property-based approach but also arguing that the long-term use of the GPS
would indeed violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); id. at
419 (Alito, J., concurring) (agreeing a Fourth Amendment search occurred, but
arguing that the Court should have analyzed the case using the Katz test).
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parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that
they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that
they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online
retailers. . . . I for one doubt that people would accept
without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
government of a list of every Web site they had visited in
the last week, or month, or year. 87
Justice Sotomayor argued that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence should stop treating secrecy as a requirement for
privacy. 88
“[One] would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.” 89 Justice Sotomayor contended that the third-party
doctrine, as it stands now, is unsuitable for a digital world.90 Her
position becomes more relevant as the IoT continues to grow—as
more devices monitor one’s activities, an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy will eventually cease to exist.
V. FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS FAIL IN THE IOT

As Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved, Congress
realized that advancing technology could lead to potential
inconsistencies in applying this developing area of law. 91
Congress’s concern of advancing technology prompted it to
commission its Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide
guidance regarding how the Fourth Amendment should apply as
technology progressed. 92 In 1985, the OTA generated a report
87. Id. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 418.
89. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
90. Id. at 417.
91. Allegra Bianchini, Note, Always On, Always Listening: Navigating
Fourth Amendment Rights in a Smart Home, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO
1, 16 (2018).
92. Id.
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concluding that privacy protection was “weak, ambiguous, or
nonexistent,” despite Supreme Court guidance. 93 Based on the
findings of the OTA’s report, Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to address the lack of Fourth
Amendment protection caused by the third-party doctrine.94
As a subsection of the ECPA, Congress enacted the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), which was premised on the theory that
the proprietary interest of information should not change based
solely upon a third-party service provider electronically storing that
information rather than the owner.95 Electronic storage means
“any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;”
and “any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication.” 96 As this Comment will illustrate below, the
SCA’s protections are inadequate in the face of a modern
technological world. 97
A. Rules of Compelled Disclosure by the Government
The SCA was promulgated to maintain an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy even where communications are
stored with a service provider despite the third-party doctrine.98
However, one component of the SCA, “compelled disclosure,” allows
the government to obtain data stored with a service provider
without a warrant in certain situations.99 Whether the government
needs a warrant, or a mere court order or subpoena, depends on the
level of protection the stored information is afforded. 100 The SCA
determines the level of protection afforded to stored information by
93. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-CIT-293,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 45 (1985)).
94. Id at 17.
95. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2012).
97. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 17–18.
98. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 816 (2003).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Kerr, supra note 98, at 816.
100. See § 2703 (a)–(b).
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classifying it based on three distinct categories: the type of service
provided, the type of information sought, and the length of time for
which the information is stored. 101
1. Electronic Communications Service v. Remote Computing
Service
Under the SCA, a provider can either be an Electronic
Communications Service (ECS), which provides its users “the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications” or a
Remote Computing Service (RCS), which provides its users online
“storage or processing services.” 102 Determining the service
provider’s designation is not based on the provider’s status in the
abstract, but rather the provider’s interaction with a particular
communication; a given provider can be classified as an ECS at one
point and an RCS at another. 103 For example, when someone sends
an electronic communication to another, the provider is an ECS
until the message is opened. 104 If the recipient of the information
decides to save the message for future reference, then the same
provider is now acting as an RCS in storing that communication. 105
A court’s classification is important because an ECS provider is
afforded more protection than an RCS provider. 106
2.

Content v. Non–Content

The second category is based upon what type of information the
government wants to obtain—content or non-content. 107 “Content”
is the information in the communication that one intends to share

101. § 2703; Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012)
(providing rules that govern when an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can
voluntarily disclose information to the government).
102. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214
(2004) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15), 2711(2)).
103. Eric R. Hinz, A Distinctionless Distinction: Why the RCS/ECS
Distinction in the Stored Communications Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 489, 496 (2012).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 500–01 (illustrating the fact that RCS is afforded a lower
threshold of protection).
107. See Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
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with another.108 The body of the message in an email would be
considered the “content.” 109 In contrast, “non-content,” also
referred to as metadata, is what the provider uses to deliver and
process the communication. 110 For example, the name and email
address of the recipient would be considered “non-content”
information. 111 The SCA provides greater protection to “content”
information because messages intended for a certain recipient
implicate greater privacy concerns.112
3.

Time in Storage

The third category is based on the amount of time that a
communication is stored. 113 Communications stored for 180 or
fewer days and those stored longer than 180 days are provided
different levels of protection.114 For example, if a communication
that is considered “content” (unopened email) 115 is held within an
ECS for 100 days, the government must obtain a warrant pursuant
to section 2703(a) of the SCA to access that data. 116 However, if
that same communication is stored longer than 180 days, then the
government need only obtain a court order or subpoena pursuant to
section 2703(d). 117
B. Rules of Compelled Disclosure Fail in an IoT World
A court’s characterization of information under the SCA will
dictate how the government can compel disclosure of that
information. 118 The only time the government must obtain a
warrant is when an ECS provider stores “content” information that
108. Kerr, supra note 102, at 1228.
109. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
110. Kerr, supra note 102, at 1228.
111. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
112. See Kerr, supra note 102, at 1228.
113. See Christina Raquel, Blue Skies Ahead: Clearing the Air for
Information Privacy in the Cloud, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 467, 485 (2015).
114. See id.
115. See Kerr, supra note 102, at 1216 (“[W]hen an e-mail customer leaves
a copy of an already-accessed e-mail stored on a server, that copy is no longer
‘incident to transmission’ . . . rather, it is just in remote storage like any other
file held by an RCS.”).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
117. Id.
118. See Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
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is held for fewer than 180 days; in all other instances, the
government need only obtain a subpoena or court order to obtain
the sought-after information.119 If that fact is not chilling enough,
technology has advanced to a point where these simple rules, which
appear to favor the government, have become blurred.
In today’s technological society, service providers can perform
the functions of an ECS and RCS simultaneously, 120 and
distinctions between “content” and “non-content” information have
become unclear. 121 For example, if providers can perform ECS and
RCS functions simultaneously, then the government can classify
the provider as an RCS and simply obtain a court order pursuant
to section 2703(d), or provide the customer notice and subpoena the
information; the government can delay notice up to ninety days,
however, if notification would have adverse results. 122 Moreover,
the government may forego attempting to obtain “content”
information given that “non-content” data can now reveal intimate
details about our lives; according to NSA’s former general counsel,
Stewart Baker, “[m]etadata absolutely tells you everything about
somebody’s life.” 123
As a result, the SCA fails to provide the level of protection
needed from government intrusion, especially in an IoT world
where a third-party provider will constantly stream and store one’s
private information. Although new statutes and case law are
recognizing the need for more privacy protection in the digital age,
the legislature and judiciary are failing to keep up with
advancements in technology. 124
119. See Hinz, supra note 103, at 501. The standard for a court order is
much lower than the probable cause standard needed for a warrant. See
§ 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication . . .
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
120. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
121. See id. at 19; Kerr, supra note 102, at 1227–28 (discussing the
difficulties in distinguishing “content” from “non-content” information).
122. See Hinz, supra note 103, at 501; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (2012)
(providing the ways in which the government may delay notice because of an
“adverse result”).
123. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY
AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 39 (2016).
124. See California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1546.1 (West 2017). This statute mandates that the government obtain
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VI. PIERCING THE ARMOR OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE – THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. CARPENTER

In Riley v. California, the Court held that a warrantless search
of a cell phone was not reasonable, even where the cell phone was
seized from the defendant’s body incident to arrest. 125 The Court
reasoned that a cell phone required heightened protection given the
amount of data that can be stored on each device; that is, cell
phones can contain essentially every facet of an individual’s life. 126
The Riley decision was appealing because the Court appeared to
signal its recognition that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
needed adjusting to accommodate a digital world. There is a
significant amount of language in the Court’s decision that suggests
Riley is just “the tip of the iceberg” because “[w]e’re now in a ‘digital
age’ and quantity of data and the ‘qualitatively different’ nature of
at least some digital records changes how the Fourth Amendment

a warrant and particularly describe the electronic communication the
government intends to search, and requires the government to provide notice
to the target of the warrant. Id. Furthermore, the statute provides protection
to many more companies given the statute’s broad definition of “service
provider.” Id. § 1546(j). However, when information is sent without human
involvement (as it does with the Amazon Edge), when and how information
becomes an electronic communication is unclear. Because the definition of a
“service provider” is dependent on whether it provides the user the ability to
send or receive electronic communications, the government can still argue its
away around the warrant requirement. Id.; Pfeifle, supra note 4 at 434–37.
For other examples of attempts to provide consumers with greater protection,
see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-5-601 to -605 (West 2017) (requiring the
government to obtain a warrant prior to compelling a provider to disclose a
user’s communication, but still allowing the government to prevent providers
from notifying its customers of the disclosure); United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 284, 286–87 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a user has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their email, and concluding that even where a user
agrees to provide the user’s internet service provider (ISP) with access to their
emails, that is not enough to defeat Fourth Amendment protections).
125. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
126. Id. at 393 (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading . . . many of these
devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be
used as a telephone. . . . One of the most notable distinguishing features of
modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity.”).
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should apply.” 127 Nevertheless, the Court limited its ruling to cases
that involve a search incident to arrest.128
The Court answered the question regarding aggregated digital
information in United States v. Carpenter.129 The majority opinion,
authored by Chief Justice Roberts—who also authored Riley—held
that a cell phone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cell phone’s geolocation data.130 The Court focused on guideposts
created by prior case law, specifically how the Fourth Amendment
seeks to secure “‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’” 131
and “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.” 132
Prior to Carpenter, the government could compel cell phone
carriers under the SCA to turn over a user’s cell-site location
information (CSLI) whenever it could offer “‘specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the
records sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.’” 133 CSLI is generated from cell phones sending
signals to and from “cell sites,” which are radio antennas mounted
on “tower[s] . . . light posts, flag poles, church steeples, or the sides
of buildings.” 134 Whenever a cell phone user sends or receives a
text, phone call, or uses data, that individual creates CSLI. 135 Most
notably, the SCA’s requirement for the government to obtain a
user’s CSLI is a lower standard than the probable cause standard
required for warrants.
In 2011, the police arrested four men suspected in a string of
robberies in Detroit, Michigan. 136 One of the men confessed to all
of the robberies and provided officers with his call records from the

127. Orin S. Kerr, The Significance of Riley, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of riley/ [https://perma.cc/5FLN7RRT].
128. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 n.1.
129. United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
130. Id. at 2219.
131. Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1986)).
132. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
133. Id. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
134. Id. at 2211.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2212.
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time of the robberies, a list of suspects, and their phone numbers. 137
Armed with that information, “the prosecutors applied for court
orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone
records for petitioner Timothy Carpenter and several other
suspects.” 138 Federal magistrate judges granted the prosecutors’
requests and ordered MetroPCS and Sprint, two wireless carriers
with whom Carpenter had accounts, to disclose CSLI for the
“origination and . . . termination [of] incoming and outgoing calls”
to Carpenter’s cell phone during the period in which the robberies
occurred.139 As a result, “the Government obtained 12,898 location
points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data
points per day.” 140 With that information, the government was able
to show that Carpenter was present at several of the crimes scenes
at the times during which the robberies occurred. 141 After
presenting this information at trial, Carpenter was convicted on all
but one count and received a sentence of more than 100 years in
prison. 142
Following his conviction, Carpenter appealed to the Sixth
Circuit. 143 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court and held that
“Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
location information collected by the FBI because he shared that
information with his wireless carriers.” 144 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that because “cell phone users voluntarily convey cellsite data to their carriers as ‘a means of establishing
communication,’” the CSLI is not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection. 145 Carpenter then filed for a petition of certiorari,
which the Supreme Court granted. 146

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
2016)).
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2213.
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir.
Id.
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Carpenter is a unique case given that the majority recognized
something “qualitatively different” in the digital data at issue. 147
Chief Justice Roberts created a unique exception because he saw
government acquisition of CSLI as sitting “at the intersection of two
lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the
privacy interest at stake.” 148 The first line of cases “addresses a
person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and
movements.” 149 The second set of cases relies on the third-party
doctrine of Smith and Miller where Chief Justice Roberts wrote,
“the Court has drawn a line between what a person keeps to himself
and what he shares with others . . . [maintaining] that ‘a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.’” 150 However, unlike precedent
illustrating the Court’s concern over technology diminishing one’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, Chief Justice Roberts—instead
of reevaluating Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—took a novel
approach and applied both lines of precedent to CSLI, balancing
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements against
one providing his movements to a third-party.
Chief Justice Roberts found that the government invaded
Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical
movements when it accessed CSLI from Carpenter’s wireless
carrier. 151 In the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Roberts accounted
for the advancement in a wireless carrier’s capability to pinpoint an
individual’s location, the private nature of a person’s movements
and the sensitive information it may reveal, and the ability of the
government “to retrace a person’s whereabouts” which was subject
only to a wireless carrier’s five-year retention policy. 152 Chief
Justice Roberts then weighed his findings against the third-party
doctrine concerns of Smith and Miller. 153 He found that when
looking at “the nature of the particular documents sought” to
147. Id. at 2216–17.
148. Id. at 2214–15.
149. Id. at 2215. Chief Justice Roberts cited to United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1983) and United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) for the stated
proposition. Id.
150. Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
151. Id. at 2219.
152. Id. at 2218.
153. See id. at 2219–20.
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determine whether “there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’
concerning their contents . . . the Government fail[ed] to appreciate
that there [were] no comparable limitations on the revealing nature
of CSLI.” 154 CSLI, which is “a detailed chronicle of a person’s
physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several
years . . . implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered
in Smith and Miller.” 155
Chief Justice Roberts correctly recognized that the voluntary
disclosure rationale of the third party doctrine does not make sense
in the CSLI context. 156 CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally
understands the term,” since the “sharing” occurs automatically
“without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up [his cell phone].” 157 More importantly, Carpenter
illustrated the fact that there are many digital applications from
which the government could obtain copious amounts of data about
an individual. 158 Instead of finding that the third-party doctrine
should not apply in a digital world given that “people often do
reasonably expect that information they entrust to third parties . . .
will be kept private,” 159 the majority created a balancing test where
courts must assign value to different categories of information and
weigh the individual’s privacy rights in that information against a
third-party disclosure. Thus, the Court dispelled the notion that a
person never has an expectation of privacy in digital information
held by third parties. 160
VII.THE ANSWER TO FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE – THE “ADHESION BAILMENT DOCTRINE”

As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Carpenter, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is at a crossroad regarding the third-

154. Id. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
155. Id. at 2220.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2263.
160. See id. at 2263, 2267. “[I]f the third party doctrine is supposed to
represent a normative assessment of when a person should expect privacy [in
information conveyed to third parties], the notion that the answer might be
‘never’ seems a pretty unattractive societal prescription.” Id. at 2263.
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party doctrine and advanced digital technology. 161 In an IoT world,
a user’s profile is created simply from that user completing
everyday mundane tasks. 162 Thus, courts are left to determine
whether the user-generated profiles are voluntarily conveyed,
whether the information is of a type that deserves Fourth
Amendment protection, and how strong the government’s interests
are in obtaining the user’s information—a daunting task. Aside
from some innovative state legislation and a novel approach that
would provide an IoT user with enhanced privacy protection within
their home, society remains in limbo as its reasonable expectation
of privacy continues to diminish in the digital age.163 This
Comment attempts to provide a more comprehensive solution,
drawing from Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Carpenter.
Justice Gorsuch proposed a pre-Katz approach that deals with
problems of modern technology. The basis of his idea was simple
and drew from the language of the Fourth Amendment: “[T]he
traditional approach asked if a house, paper or effect was yours
under law. No more was needed to trigger the Fourth
Amendment.” 164 There are several advantages of using that kind
of property-based approach. Judges will have a much easier time
navigating the issues of the third-party doctrine as that approach
would remove from the judge “their own personal policy
preferences” about the reasonableness of one’s expectation of
privacy and allow for “legislative participation in the Fourth

161. See id. at 2215–16.
162. See supra Part I.
163. Supra text accompanying note 122; see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The
Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
805, 866–87 (2016) (providing the theory of “Digital Curtilage”). Digital
Curtilage is a concept that is applied much like the traditional protection one
receives from the physical curtilage that surrounds a home. Id. Essentially,
digital curtilage would include IoT devices that are connected in the home and
that communicate information that flows from the home to third-party
providers. Id. Thus, once an IoT device is connected to a home network, the
third-party doctrine should apply given the all-inclusive and intimate nature
of the information contained within. Id. Although this approach would provide
sufficient protection in an IoT user’s home, the issue is that IoT devices compile
data on users even when the user is traveling outside the home, such as
shopping at the mall, parking a car, or ordering food. Thus, a stronger, more
holistic approach is needed to provide an IoT user with adequate protection
regardless of whether the individual is in the home.
164. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267–68.
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Amendment context.” 165 Most importantly, “Fourth Amendment
protections for your papers and effects do not automatically
disappear just because you share them with third parties.” 166
Justice Gorsuch realized the prominent effect Katz has had on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that courts would need help
to reapply the traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment.
However, he acknowledged that more work is needed to resuscitate
this area of law before his theory could be fully implemented, and
thus offered multiple thoughts for guidance. 167 One of his chief
thoughts was his proposal to use bailments as a way of addressing
third-party doctrine issues. 168
“A bailment is the ‘delivery of personal property by one person
(the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a
certain purpose.” 169 A bailee has a legal obligation to keep the item
or thing safe, and to use it in accordance with the agreed upon
intended purpose, or otherwise the bailee could face legal
consequences.170 Justice Gorsuch cements his theory of bailments
in the traditional Fourth Amendment precedent of Ex parte
Jackson, 171 where the Court wrote: “The constitutional guaranty of
the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be.” 172 Justice
Gorsuch also opined that “[j]ust because you entrust your data—in
some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a third party
may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its
contents.”173 Justice Gorsuch provides a foundation on which this
165. See id. at 2268.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 2268–71.
168. Id. at 2268–69.
169. Id. at 2268 (quoting Bailment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014)) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, § 2, at
2 (1832)).
170. See id. at 2268–69.
171. 96 U.S. 727 (1878). This Court held that sealed letters placed in the
mail are “as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding
them in their own domiciles.” Id. at 733.
172. Id.
173. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269. An example of a bailment would be when
an individual gives his car keys to a valet at a restaurant; that individual
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Comment builds its theory of the “adhesion bailment.” The
“adhesion bailment doctrine” is premised on fairness and provides
enhanced protection to the individual IoT user. Courts can use
bailments as a way to clarify what privacy protection an IoT user
maintains.
There are two ways one can view a service provider as a
bailee. 174 The first is viewing a third-party company as an
intermediary, i.e., a bailee, who is provided the information to
perform a task, rather than as the “recipient” of the information.
For example, when one uses an IoT device such as an Amazon Echo
and asks it to send an email, Amazon, the third-party company, is
not the recipient of that information. The IoT user is “voluntarily”
sending that information to Amazon, and even though Amazon may
store the information for business purposes, Amazon’s main
function is to take that information and deliver it to the actual
intended recipient. Thus, just as a mail carrier cannot consent to
the disclosure of the contents of the letter she is delivering, Amazon
cannot consent to the disclosure of the contents of the email.
Furthermore, the government’s argument that the IoT user does
not have exclusive control or complete ownership over the
information should be rejected. If anything, the opposite principle
is reflected in American jurisprudence, as tenants who rent an
apartment and family members who do not own legal title to their
home “still have standing to complain about searches of the houses
in which they live.” 175 Therefore, IoT users who voluntarily provide
data to a third-party company as a bailee, or in an intermediary
capacity, should maintain Fourth Amendment protection in that
information.
The second way to view a third-party company as a bailee is
through the proposed “adhesion bailment doctrine.”176 This
doctrine provides greater protection to the IoT user than the
current regime and is premised on inherent fairness. As noted
above, society is coming to a point where the IoT will constantly
gather data on all individuals. By merely living in an IoT world,
knows that he will get his keys and vehicle back at the end of his meal. Id. at
2268.
174. See id. at 2268–69. This paragraph draws from Justice Gorsuch’s
theory on bailments and applies it practically in the IoT world.
175. Id. at 2269–70.
176. The “adhesion bailment doctrine” is based on this author’s own theory.
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one is continuously providing data to a third party; it is difficult to
understand how anyone can honestly state that such information is
voluntarily conveyed. The third-party doctrine is predicated on an
individual voluntarily providing information to another.
Accordingly, the “adhesion bailment doctrine” is triggered when a
third-party company collects data on individuals through means of
the user’s day-to-day activities—essentially, the user will
automatically have Fourth Amendment protection in the
information third-party companies collect through the user’s daily
routine. The fact that the information collected from third-party
companies from IoT users is not voluntarily disclosed is the central
part of the reasoning why the term “adhesion” is used in this
doctrine’s name. Thus, regardless of how advanced technology
becomes, the user’s privacy rights will always remain intact.
For example, in the IoT, the government could obtain a
subpoena for the records of a conversation an individual had while
sitting in front of his television at home, not realizing the TV was
recording him. The government could also obtain one’s
conversations and whereabouts while driving a vehicle because
many cars have emergency communications hardware installed,
similar to OnStar technology. In more advanced cities, sensors are
placed in many objects, such as recycling bins. As one passes by,
the sensor can track the Wi-Fi signals from passing phones, giving
the government an individual’s location at any given time. These
examples highlight only a few ways the government can use the IoT
to investigate individuals. If courts followed the “adhesion
bailment doctrine,” any attempt by the government to obtain the
type of data described would trigger Fourth Amendment protection
to the IoT user. Therefore, the government would have to establish
probable cause and either obtain a warrant or show a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement to receive any information
stored with the third-party companies. This solution provides
ample protection to the IoT user by prohibiting the government
from using the current interpretation of the third-party doctrine to
obtain sensitive personal information without probable cause—the
standard required according to the Constitution.177

177. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION

Federal law and jurisprudence regarding digital privacy has
not responded to advancements in technology quickly enough.
Although some state legislatures have attempted to create more
privacy protection for individuals, those laws are still lacking, and
more importantly, they only protect the individuals of the
respective state. Additionally, current legislation and common law
are continuing to provide the government with backdoor access
around an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection through the
use of the third-party doctrine. Nevertheless, if the third-party
doctrine is abandoned, it will likely be replaced with something that
is more complicated, or at least more nuanced, than its predecessor.
Thus, until workable law is created that will balance the need of
government investigation and individual privacy protection of
digital data, the third-party doctrine will remain. Accordingly, this
Comment’s proposed doctrine of adhesion bailments provides
protection to the individual IoT user, and at the same time, does
not alter the interpretation of the third-party doctrine. Although
the government will not have the power it currently possesses in
the digital age, it can still use the third-party doctrine in limited
respects, creating a workable balance between governmental
intrusion and protection of individual privacy. Of course, the
government can continue to conduct investigations as it has prior
to the advancement of technology—through adherence to the
Fourth Amendment.
However, even though this Comment
proposes a way of maintaining an individual’s privacy rights in the
digital age, the overwhelming theme is that technology is always
advancing. Today witnesses the IoT, tomorrow might see artificial
intelligence, and what else the future holds, no one knows. Thus,
the Fourth Amendment must be adaptable to an ever-changing
society.

